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Do	Corporations	Learn	from	Mispricing?	
	
Evidence	from	Takeovers	and	Corporate	Performance	
	
	
Abstract		In	this	article	we	form	the	simple	prediction	that	mispricing	encourages	traders	to	collect	costly	information	 that	 guides	 managerial	 decisions	 at	 corporate	 level.	 Our	 findings	 support	 this	prediction	based	on	evidence	derived	from	both	the	US	market	for	corporate	control	as	well	as	the	 overall	 variation	 in	 aggregate	 corporate	 profits.	 The	 trading	 activity	 in	 response	 to	 the	temporary	mispricing	of	 the	merging	companies	provides	useful	 information	 that	 leads	 to	 the	design	of	high-synergy	deals.	Such	synergies	are	reflected	in	an	increase	in	the	announcement	period	 acquirer	 abnormal	 returns	 and	 are	 not	 reversed	 in	 the	 long-run.	 At	 the	 market-wide	level,	 our	 results	 suggest	 that	 the	 growth	 in	 the	 overall	 stock	 trading	 volume	 in	 response	 to	market	 mispricing	 is	 associated	 with	 high	 future	 corporate	 profit	 growth.	 Overall,	 after	controlling	 for	 several	 economic	 and	 financial	 conditions,	 the	 temporary	 mispricing	 in	 a	developed	 and	 generally	 efficient	 stock	 market	 stimulates	 informative	 trading,	 ultimately	leading	to	value-	and	performance-enhancing	corporate	decisions.		
Keywords:	Mispricing;	Information;	Acquisitions;	Acquirer	returns;	Corporate	profits.		
JEL	Classification:	G14,	G34.																													
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1.	Introduction	By	 aggregating	 information	 from	 investors,	 the	 stock	 market	 guides	 corporate	 investment	decisions	 (hereafter	 corporate	 decisions)	 via	 two	 channels.	 First,	 the	 reaction	 of	 equity	investors	to	corporate	announcements	conveys	signals	to	managers	about	the	valuations	of	the	firms	 they	 manage.	 Second,	 even	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 corporate	 announcements	 that	 primarily	supply	 new	 information	 to	 investors,	 the	 trading	 activity	 of	 investors	 can	 still	 transmit	 new	information	 about	 their	 estimates	 regarding	 the	 values	 of	 the	 firms.	 Along	 these	 lines,	 Roll	(1988)	 argues	 that	 ‘the	 financial	 press	misses	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 relevant	 information	 generated	privately’	(p.	564).	Our	objective	in	this	article	is	to	provide	a	comprehensive	examination	of	the	conditions	under	which	the	second	channel	is	likely	to	provide	useful	guidance	to	managers	in	their	 corporate	 decisions.	 Specifically,	 we	 ask	 the	 following	 question:	 when	 do	 corporate	managers	 extract	 information	 from	 the	 stock	 market	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 their	 corporate	decisions?	At	 first	 glance,	 the	 inclination	 is	 to	 suggest	 that	 corporate	 managers	 should	 rely	 on	 the	appraisals	of	the	equity	investors	when	they	perceive	the	market	to	be	informationally	efficient	in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 all	 the	 costly	 information	 that	 they	 require	 is	 fully	 reflected	 in	 the	prevailing	 prices.	 However,	 in	 their	 seminal	 article,	 Grossman	 and	 Stiglitz	 (1980)	 argue	 that	there	 is	 limited	 incentive	 for	 market	 participants	 to	 acquire	 costly	 information	 when	 prices	convey	all	the	information.	Specifically,	Grossman	and	Stiglitz	demonstrate	that	an	‘equilibrium	degree	of	disequilibrium’	(p.	393)	is	required	wherein	prices	reflect	information	only	partially.	Under	 this	 condition,	 one	 would	 expect	 that	 investors	 who	 allocate	 valuable	 resources	 to	information	collection	are	compensated	for	their	efforts.	If	the	Grossman	and	Stiglitz	(1980)	conclusion	holds,	then	firms	whose	shares	exhibit	some	degree	 of	 mispricing	 (i.e.,	 prices	 that	 differ	 from	 the	 theoretical	 ideal	 price	 in	 a	 perfectly	integrated	and	efficient	market)	are	likely	to	be	the	ones	that	attract	the	attention	of	investors.	For	 example,	 when	 a	 company’s	 share	 price	 exhibits	 a	 noticeable	 positive	 trend,	 it	 might	become	subject	to	increasing	coverage	by	industry	experts	in	order	to	understand	whether	the	prevailing	prices	reflect	growing	investment	opportunities,	among	other	potential	explanations.	Such	 increased	 coverage	 by	 industry	 experts	 might	 raise	 the	 attention	 of	 the	 company’s	managers	 to	 otherwise	 overlooked	 valuable	 investment	 opportunities.	 More	 importantly,	 the	prevailing	mispricing	incentivizes	equity	traders	to	invest	in	the	acquisition	of	new	information	about	 the	 firm’s	 growth	 opportunities	 and	 hence	 make	 trading	 decisions	 based	 on	 such	information.	While	 arbitrageurs	 do	 not	 communicate	 directly	with	 the	 firm’s	managers,	 their	trading	activities	offer	credible	signals	that	managers	can	rely	upon	in	order	to	effectively	steer	their	corporate	policies.	Consequently,	the	variation	in	stock	prices	due	to	the	trading	activity	of	the	informed	equity	investors	allows	the	firm’s	managers	to	infer	valuable	information	that	they	
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would	 not	 otherwise	 possess	 about	 the	 growth	 prospects	 of	 their	 firm.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	integration	 of	 such	 information	 in	 the	 managerial	 decision-making	 process	 allows	 the	 firm’s	managers	 to	be	 engaged	 in	 synergy-enhancing	 investments	 that	 can,	 in	 turn,	 foster	 corporate	growth,	boost	profitability,	and	improve	shareholders’	wealth.	Analytically,	we	examine	whether	Grossman	and	Stiglitz	(1980)	proposition	applies	to	the	takeover	market.	 In	 the	 US	market	whereby	 price	 noisiness	 tends	 to	 be	 temporary	 (Alvarez-Ramirez,	 Alvarez,	 Rodriguez,	 &	 Fernandez-Anaya,	 2008),	 we	 expect	 the	 trading	 activity	 that	emerges	 in	 response	 to	 the	 mispricing	 of	 the	 acquiring	 firms’	 shares	 to	 convey	 valuable	information	 that	 the	managers	of	 these	 firms	successfully	 incorporate	 in	 their	 takeover	plans.	This	 trading	 activity	 is	 especially	 relevant	when	 equity	 investors	 realize	 that	 the	 company	 is	considering	 a	 takeover,	 start	 gathering	 information	 about	 the	 potential	 synergies	 of	 the	takeover,	 and	 subsequently	 make	 trading	 decisions	 based	 on	 such	 information.	 As	 the	 pre-acquisition	mispricing	 of	 the	 target	 firm	may	 also	motivate	 investors	 to	 collect	 the	 rare	 and	costly	information	about	the	target’s	business	conditions	and	growth	prospects,	we	expect	the	trading	activity	in	the	target’s	shares	in	response	to	mispricing	to	convey	valuable	information	that	the	acquiring	firms	incorporate	in	their	takeover	plans.	As	a	result,	the	parties	involved	in	takeover	negotiations	–	as	they	finalize	their	takeover	plans	–	can	extract	relevant	information	about	the	prospect	of	their	deals	by	monitoring	the	variations	in	their	stock	prices.	Empirically,	we	predict	that	the	trading	activities	in	response	to	temporary	mispricing	in	both	the	acquiring	and	 the	 target	 firms’	 shares	 are	 associated	 with	 increases	 in	 acquirer	 announcement	 period	abnormal	returns	that	are	not	reversed	in	the	post-announcement	period.	We	 test	 this	 prediction	 using	 a	 dataset	 that	 covers	 849	 public-to-public	 domestic	 US	mergers	during	the	period	from	January	2001	to	December	2014	(inclusive).	The	Hurst	(1951)	exponent	level	is	used	to	quantify	the	firm-level	degree	of	mispricing.	This	level	of	mispricing	is	defined	as	 the	absolute	value	of	 the	difference	between	 the	estimated	Hurst	 exponent	and	 its	predicted	value	under	the	random	walk	hypothesis	based	on	the	daily	stock	returns	during	the	
t-240	to	t-43	days	before	the	acquisition	announcement,	where	t	 is	the	merger	announcement	day.	 The	 higher	 this	measure,	 the	more	 likely	 it	 is	 that	 the	 stock	 prices	 exhibit	 either	 trend-reinforcing	 patterns	 or	 frequent	 reversals	 relative	 to	 the	 random	 walk	 before	 the	 equity	investors	receive	the	early	signs	that	the	company	in	considering	a	takeover.	The	43rd	day	cutoff	is	motivated	by	previous	research,	such	as	Schwert	(1996)	and	Betton	et	al.	(2014),	as	the	day	at	which	 news	 about	 potential	 acquisitions	 start	 to	 leak	 to	 financial	 markets,	 which	 ultimately	triggers	pre-acquisition	variations	 in	 the	merging	 firms’	prices.1	Our	main	results	suggest	 that	the	turnover	in	the	merging	firms’	shares	in	the	period	following	the	mispricing	–	from	the	43rd	
																																								 																				
1 Siganos (2013) uses the 30th day before the acquisition announcement as the starting date in measuring the target’s pre-
acquisition price run-up. The findings that we report in this study are not altered qualitatively or quantitatively if cutoff dates 
such as the 60th, 50th, 40th, and 30th day before the acquisition announcement are introduced to the analysis. 
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to	 the	10th	day	preceding	 the	acquisition	announcement	–	provides	useful	 information	 for	 the	companies	in	finalizing	their	takeover	plans,	which	in	turn	leads	to	significant	increases	in	the	acquirer	abnormal	returns.	We	 recognize	 that	 there	 are	 potentially	 several	 factors	 that	 can	 influence	 the	 equity	investors’	perception	of	the	merger	synergies.	We	form	simple	predictions	in	order	to	account	for	the	impact	of	such	factors	in	our	analysis.	To	highlight	the	effect	of	the	acquisition’s	payment	method	 and	 the	 potential	 overvaluation	 of	 the	 acquiring	 firm	 (Rhodes-Kropf,	 Robinson,	 &	Viswanathan,	 2005;	 Rhodes–Kropf	 &	 Viswanathan,	 2004;	 Shleifer	 &	 Vishny,	 2003;	 Travlos,	1987),	we	control	for	the	wealth	effects	arising	from	the	use	of	stock	financing.	Moreover,	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	acquiring	firms	(pre-)owning	shares	in	the	target	firms	(i.e.,	toehold	or	pre-bid	ownership	of	target	shares),	and	acquiring	firms	that	operate	in	the	same	industry	as	their	 targets	 (i.e.,	 focused	 deals),	 among	 others,	 hold	 relatively	 more	 information	 about	 the	merger	 and	are	 less	 likely	 to	 rely	on	 the	 guidance	offered	 through	 the	 stock	market’s	 trading	activity.	 To	 accommodate	 these	 effects,	 we	 control	 for	 the	 wealth	 effects	 of	 toehold	 levels	(Betton	and	Eckbo,	2000)	as	well	as	the	industry	relatedness	of	the	merging	firms	(Denis,	Denis,	&	Yost,	2002).	Given	that	firms	with	large	block-holders	are	more	likely	to	‘listen’	to	the	market	and	are	more	immune	to	agency	problems	(Kau,	Linck,	&	Rubin,	2008),	we	also	control	for	the	percentage	of	acquirer	 shares	 that	are	closely	held	by	a	 small	group	of	 investors.	Overall,	our	conclusions	 remain	 highly	 consistent	 after	 controlling	 for	 these	 effects,	 the	 acquirer’s	 and	targets’	valuation	and	growth	prospects,	in	addition	to	the	industry	and	time	fixed	effects.	A	 valid	 concern	 regarding	 the	 robustness	 of	 our	 results	 is	 that	 the	 positive	 effect	 of	 the	share	turnover	on	the	acquirer	abnormal	returns	in	deals	involving	mispriced	firms	is	itself	an	illustration	of	the	acquiring	and/or	the	target	firms’	mispricing.	Consequently,	the	high	acquirer	(short-run)	 abnormal	 returns	might	 be	 reversed	 in	 the	 post-announcement	 period.	 However,	our	results	of	the	analysis	of	the	acquirer	long-run	abnormal	returns	are	inconsistent	with	this	concern.	 In	 particular,	 the	 positive	 effect	 of	 the	 stock	 trading	 activity	 in	 response	 to	 pre-acquisition	mispricing	on	the	acquirer	announcement	period	abnormal	returns	is	not	reversed	in	 the	 long-run.	 This	 evidence	 supports	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 trading	 activity	 conveys	 useful	information	to	the	merging	firms	in	order	to	realize	high	and	persistent	synergies.	Previous	research	also	stresses	the	role	of	 the	stock	market’s	 informativeness	 in	affecting	the	variation	of	 corporate	 investments	 (Chen,	Goldstein,	&	 Jiang,	2007),	 the	 efficiency	of	 such	investments	(Durnev,	Morck,	&	Yeung,	2004),	and	the	prediction	of	corporate	earnings	(Durnev,	Morck,	 Yeung,	 &	 Zarowin,	 2003).	 These	 studies	 employ	 either	 the	 Roll	 (1988)	 price	 non-synchronicity	measure2	(Durnev	et	al.,	2003)	or	the	probability	of	informed	trading	(Chen	et	al.,	
																																								 																				
2 This measure is estimated as the portion of the variation in a company’s stock returns that is not explained by the market 
and industry-related factors. 
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2007;	 Durnev	 et	 al.,	 2004)	 to	 represent	 the	 degree	 of	 market	 informativeness.	 Durnev	 et	 al.	(2004)	 also	 relate	 their	 use	 of	 price	 informativeness	 measures	 to	 the	 Grossman	 and	 Stiglitz	(1980)	argument	that	a	lower	cost	of	private	information	acquisition	leads	to	a	higher	intensity	of	 informed	 trading.	Nevertheless,	 our	analysis	differs	 from	 these	 studies	 in	 the	key	aspect	of	highlighting	 another	 dimension	 of	 Grossman	 and	 Stiglitz.	 While	 recognizing	 the	 role	 of	information	 acquisition	 cost	 as	 a	 key	determinant	 of	 the	 amount	 of	 information	 incorporated	into	stock	prices,	the	main	counterintuitive	result	of	Grossman	and	Stiglitz	is	that	some	degree	of	 inefficient	pricing	 is	needed	 for	 the	 stock	market	 to	attract	 traders	 that	 invest	 in	acquiring	relevant	 information.	 It	 is	 with	 this	 key	 result	 in	 mind	 that	 we	 present	 the	 degree	 of	 firm-specific	mispricing	as	a	main	incentive	for	relevant	information	collection.	Subsequently,	we	use	the	share	turnover	in	response	to	this	mispricing	as	a	measure	of	informed	trading.	Extant	 studies	 also	 find	 that	 the	 merging	 firms’	 managers	 extract	 information	 from	 the	stock	market’s	 reaction	 to	merger	announcements	 in	order	 to	determine	whether	 the	merger	should	 be	 consummated	 (Luo,	 2005;	 Kau	 et	 al.,	 2008).	 This	 result	 is	 noticeable	 when	 the	companies	have	less	information	than	the	market	(small	and	high	technology	firms),	and	when	the	 cancellation	 of	 the	 merger	 is	 legally	 and	 logistically	 feasible	 (Luo,	 2005).	 Moreover,	 the	decision	 to	withdraw	 a	 deal	 in	 response	 to	 a	 negative	market	 reaction	 is	 also	 dependent	 on	whether	 the	 firms	 have	 large	 block-holders	 and	 their	 CEOs	 have	 high	 pay-performance	sensitivities	(Kau	et	al.,	2008).	Our	analysis	complements	these	findings	in	two	key	ways.	First,	our	 results	 suggest	 that	 the	acquiring	 firms	extract	useful	 information	as	a	 result	of	 the	stock	market’s	variation	 in	 finalizing	 their	 takeovers	before	 the	official	deal	announcement.	 Second,	while	 previous	 research	 documents	 an	 increase	 in	 options	 trading	 before	 acquisition	announcements	and	treats	such	an	increase	as	an	indicator	of	 informed	trading	in	the	options	market	(Jayaraman,	Frye,	&	Sabhenval,	2001;	Siougle,	Spyrou,	&	Tsekrekos,	2011),	our	results	put	 further	 emphasis	 on	 the	 role	 of	 the	 stock	market	 as	 a	 source	 of	 pre-acquisition	 informed	trading.	We	recognize	 that	M&A	announcements	are	not	 the	only	venues	 to	study	 the	 informative	role	 of	 the	 stock	 market	 in	 navigating	 corporate	 decisions.	 As	 a	 result,	 we	 further	 examine	whether	the	findings	documented	at	firm-specific	level	hold	in	an	aggregate	time	series	analysis	of	 overall	 corporate	 profit	 growth.	 As	 suggested	 in	 the	 Morck	 et	 al.	 (1990)	 active	 informant	hypothesis,	 the	variation	in	stock	returns	can	convey	useful	 information	about	the	state	of	the	overall	economy.	When	the	economy	can	be	in	one	of	multiple	equilibria,	the	stock	market	can	aggregate	 the	 beliefs	 of	 investors	 to	 determine	which	 one	 of	many	 potential	 equilibria	 is	 the	most	 likely.	 Morck	 et	 al.	 (1990)	 find	 limited	 support	 for	 this	 hypothesis.	 However,	 if	 the	Grossman	and	Stiglitz	(1980)	reasoning	holds	at	the	market-wide	level,	then	an	increase	in	the	stock	trading	activity	in	response	to	temporary	market-wide	mispricing	will	be	associated	with	
5		
the	 collection	 of	 relevant	 information	 that	 can	 be	 partly	 reflected	 in	 the	 stock	 prices.	 As	 the	corporate	 managers	 adjust	 their	 investment	 plans	 accordingly,	 this	 trading	 activity	 must	 be	associated	with	a	future	increase	in	corporate	profit	growth.	Our	 results	 from	 the	 Threshold	 Vector	 Autoregressive	 (TVAR)	 models	 support	 this	prediction.	In	particular	we	find	that	an	increase	in	the	overall	stock	market	trading	activity	in	response	 to	 temporary	 mispricing	 –	 which	 we	 measure	 as	 the	 absolute	 deviation	 of	 the	quarterly	 level	 of	 market-wide	 Hurst	 (1951)	 exponent	 from	 its	 predicted	 value	 under	 the	random	walk	hypothesis	–	is	associated	with	future	increases	in	the	growth	in	corporate	profits.	Put	 simply,	 both	 the	 firm-specific	 and	 aggregate-level	 evidence	 reported	 in	 this	 article	emphasize	the	role	of	the	stock	market	activity	as	an	active	informant	(Chen	et	al.,	2007;	Durnev	et	al.,	2004,	2003)	rather	than	a	simple	sideshow	(Morck	et	al.,	1990).	While	our	results	are	exclusively	related	 to	 the	US	market,	 further	analysis	 is	 required	 to	determine	 whether	 similar	 evidence	 persists	 in	 other	 markets	 with	 different	 institutional	frameworks.	 Possibly,	 mispricing	 leads	 to	 informed	 trading	 decisions	 only	 in	 liquid	 markets	with	 relatively	 transparent	 institutional	 frameworks	 and	 binding	 legal	 arrangements.	 On	 the	contrary,	 in	markets	with	 low	 liquidity,	 limited	 transparency	and	weak	 legal	 frameworks,	 the	stock	market	mispricing	might	not	be	limited	to	temporary	episodes	during	which	investors	try	to	 collect	 new	 information.	 Alternatively,	 instead	 of	 being	 temporary,	mispricing	might	 be	 an	illustration	of	more	 fundamental	problems	 related	 to	 the	 functioning	of	 the	 stock	market	and	the	difficulties	of	incorporating	information	in	the	prevailing	prices.	The	 rest	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 organised	 as	 follows:	 Section	 2	 provides	 a	 brief	 review	 of	 the	literature	on	corporate	learning	from	stock	prices;	Section	3	presents	the	M&A	dataset	used	in	the	analysis	and	discusses	the	main	sample	statistics;	Section	4	describes	the	estimation	of	the	degree	of	 firm-specific	pre-acquisition	mispricing;	 Section	5	discusses	 the	empirical	 results	of	the	 takeover-related	 analysis;	 Section	 6	 presents	 the	 time	 series	 analysis	 of	 the	 overall	 stock	market	mispricing’s	impact	on	overall	corporate	profits	growth,	and	Section	7	concludes.		
2.	Corporate	Learning	from	Stock	Prices	The	 seminal	 work	 by	 Hayek	 (1945)	 highlights	 the	 informative	 role	 of	 prices	 in	 guiding	 the	decisions	of	production	and	resource	allocation.	In	Hayek’s	terminology,	market	prices	solve	the	dispersed	 knowledge	 problem	 by	 aggregating	 information	 from	 many	 dissimilar	 traders	 to	guide	 decision	 makers	 in	 their	 resource	 allocation.	 While	 Hayek’s	 analysis	 was	 originally	applied	 to	 the	 goods	 and	 services	markets,	 it	 can	 be	 extended	 to	 financial	 markets	 whereby	stock	prices	offer	useful	guidance	for	corporate	managers	in	making	investment	decisions	(Dow,	Goldstein,	&	Guembel,	2016).	Along	 these	 lines,	 Subrahmanyam	and	Titman	 (1999)	stress	 the	role	 of	 serendipity:	 when	 investors	 dedicate	 substantial	 efforts	 to	 collect	 information,	 their	
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increased	 level	 of	 attention	 allows	 them,	 even	 by	 chance,	 to	 come	 across	 (often	 unexpected)	valuable	information.	As	a	result,	a	large	body	of	literature	has	been	focused	on	quantifying	the	extent	to	which	prevailing	prices	reflect	informed	trading	(Collin-Dufresne	&	Fos,	2015;	Jiang	&	Zhu,	2017;	Yan	&	Zhang,	2014). Corporate	managers	 can	 elicit	 such	 information	 by	 observing	 the	 variations	 in	 the	 stock	prices	 of	 the	 firms	 they	 manage.	 Such	 information	 is	 therefore	 a	 valuable	 resource	 for	 the	managers	in	steering	their	investment	strategies.	Morck	et	al.	(1990)	develop	what	they	refer	to	as	 the	 ‘active	 informant	 hypothesis’	 whereby	 stock	 market	 developments	 convey	 useful	information	 to	 corporate	 managers	 and	 consequently	 predict	 future	 variations	 in	 corporate	investments.	 While	 Morck	 et	 al.	 (1990)	 find	 limited	 support	 to	 this	 hypothesis	 in	 their	 time	series	analysis,	later	work	using	quantifiable	measures	of	price	informativeness	has	shown	that	corporate	 managers	 tend	 to	 learn	 from	 the	 variations	 in	 stock	 prices	 about	 their	 firm’s	fundamentals	and	subsequently	integrate	such	information	in	their	investment	decisions.	Chen	et	 al.	 (2007),	 for	 instance,	 show	 that	 the	 rise	 in	 the	 magnitude	 of	 informed	 trading	 in	 a	company’s	 stock	 increases	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 the	 company’s	 investments	 to	 stock	 market	developments.	In	 the	 field	of	M&A,	 there	 is	 strong	evidence	 from	 the	options	market	 that	 the	 rumors	of	takeover	 announcements	 tend	 to	 be	 preceded	 by	 significant	 increases	 in	 the	 magnitude	 of	informed	trading	(Jayaraman	et	al.,	2001).	In	turn,	Kau	et	al.	(2008)	show	that	the	managers	of	the	acquiring	 firms	are	 inclined	 to	 listen	 to	 the	market	and	consequently	 respond	 to	negative	reaction	 to	 their	 takeover	 announcement	 by	 cancelling	 their	 deal.	 Furthermore,	 Betton	 et	 al.	(2014)	test	a	model	whereby	the	pre-acquisition	target	price	run-up	conveys	information	to	the	merging	firms	about	the	synergies	of	the	acquisition.	While	 these	 studies	 emphasize	 the	 role	 of	 stock	market	 in	 guiding	 investment	 decisions,	more	 attention	 is	 required	 on	 the	 incentives	 of	 market	 participants	 (i.e.,	 equity	 traders)	 to	collect	 the	 costly	 information	 that	 is	much-needed	 by	 corporate	managers	who	 aim	 to	 adjust	their	 investment	 strategies.	 The	 seminal	 contribution	 of	 the	 Grossman	 and	 Stiglitz	 (1980)	emphasizes	the	role	of	price	noisiness	in	incentivizing	traders	to	collect	such	information.	In	the	Grossman	and	Stiglitz	model,	security	prices	accomplish	their	role	in	revealing	information	but	with	some	noisiness	or	even	some	delays,	 in	order	 to	ensure	 that	 the	 traders	 investing	 in	 the	acquisition	of	costly	information	are	ultimately	rewarded	for	their	efforts.	Our	 empirical	 analysis	 highlights	 the	 role	 of	 mispricing	 in	 incentivizing	 the	 informed	trading	 that	allows	corporate	managers	 to	develop	value-	and	profit-enhancing	decisions.	Our	main	empirical	prediction	is	that	the	stock	market	trading	activity	is	more	likely	to	carry	costly	and	 relevant	 information	when	 such	 activity	 emerges	 in	 response	 to	mispricing.	 At	 the	 firm-specific	level,	we	expect	the	share	turnover	that	emerges	in	response	to	mispricing	in	both	the	
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acquiring	 and	 the	 target	 firms	 in	M&As	 to	 lead	 to	high-synergy	deals	 that	 are	 also	 associated	with	 sustained	 acquirer	 abnormal	 returns.	 At	 the	 market-wide	 level,	 the	 main	 empirical	prediction	 in	 our	 time	 series	 analysis	 is	 that	 the	 trading	 activity	 that	 emerges	 in	 response	 to	temporary	mispricing	 in	 the	 stock	market	 is	 a	 significant	 predictor	 of	 increases	 in	 corporate	profit	growth.		
3.	Data	and	Sample	Statistics	Our	sample	 includes	all	US	domestic	public-to-public	M&As	collected	 from	the	Securities	Data	Corporation	 (SDC)	 M&As	 Database,	 which	 meet	 the	 following	 criteria:	 the	 bid	 is	 announced	between	 January	1,	2001	and	December	31,	2014	(inclusive);	 the	deal	 is	completed	and	has	a	disclosed	deal	value	of	at	least	$1	million;	the	acquirer	controls	100%	of	the	target	shares	at	the	deal’s	completion	date;	the	deal	payment	is	settled	in	either	cash	or	stock;	the	deals	announced	by	the	same	bidder	within	 five	 trading	days	of	each	other	are	excluded;	 the	acquiring	and	the	target	 firms’	 stock	 prices,	market	 values,	 and	market-to-book	 value	 ratios	 are	 available	 from	Datastream.	The	restriction	that	both	the	acquiring	and	the	target	firms	are	listed	in	a	stock	exchange	is	introduced	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 degrees	 of	 mispricing	 of	 both	 firms	 are	 measurable.	 The	restriction	that	the	acquirer	is	ultimately	controlling	100%	of	the	target	at	the	deal’s	completion	date	 is	 introduced	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 acquirers	 in	 the	 sample	 have	 the	 same	 objective	 of	 full	target	ownership.	Furthermore,	we	limit	the	sample	to	full	cash	and	full	stock	financed	deals	in	order	to	explicitly	distinguish	between	these	groups	in	our	multivariate	analysis.	The	analysis	is	limited	 to	 domestic	 US	 deals	 to	 guarantee	 that	 the	 degrees	 of	 mispricing	 are	 estimated	 for	acquirers	 and	 targets	 that	 operate	within	 the	 same	 institutional	 framework.	 This	 follows	 the	emphasis	by	Morck	et	al.	(2001)	on	the	role	of	institutional	frameworks	and	property	rights	as	key	 determinants	 of	 the	 difference	 in	 the	 degree	 of	 informed	 trading	 across	 countries.	Consequently,	focusing	on	domestic	deals	ensures	that	the	analysis	does	not	conflate	firm-level	informed	trading	with	the	differences	in	institutional	arrangements	between	the	acquirer’s	and	the	target’s	nations.	Table	1	presents	 the	annual	breakdown	of	 the	 sample	according	 to	 the	payment	method,	acquirer	 and	 target	 industry	 relatedness,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 target	 firm’s	 industrial	 sector.	 In	particular,	 Panel	 A	 records	 the	 annual	 distribution	 of	 our	 sampled	 deals	 in	 which:	 (a)	 the	merger	is	financed	with	either	cash	or	stocks	as	the	payment	method,	and	(b)	the	acquisition	is	either	an	 industry-focused	deal	whereby	 the	acquirer	and	the	 target	share	 the	same	two-digit	SIC	code,	or	industry	diversifying	whereby	the	acquirer	and	the	target	have	different	two-digit	SIC	codes.	The	Table	highlights	that	the	overall	M&A	activity	exhibited	its	peak	in	the	year	2001	and	 started	 declining	 thereafter.	 The	 Table	 also	 documents	 that	 the	 majority	 of	 deals	 in	 the	
8		
sample	 are	 cash	 financed	 (57.83%)	 and	 industry	 focused	 (65.14%).	 At	 the	 target	 industrial	sector	level,	 the	majority	of	deals	 in	our	sample	appear	in	the	High	Technology	and	Financials	sector,	with	 respective	percentages	of	28.39%	and	25.44%.	 In	 turn,	 the	minorities	of	deals	 in	our	sample	are	in	the	retail,	real	estate	and	media	sectors.	
(Insert	Table	1	about	here)	Table	2	presents	 the	descriptive	 statistics	of	 the	 firm-	and	deal-specific	variables	 that	we	use	in	our	analysis.	CAR_ACQ	is	the	acquirer’s	Cumulative	Abnormal	Returns.	As	in	Barbopoulos	and	Sudarsanam	 (2012)	 and	Fuller	 et	 al.	 (2002),	 this	measure	 is	 estimated	 as	 the	 sum	of	 the	daily	 differences	 between	 the	 acquirer’s	 returns	 and	 the	 returns	 of	 an	 overall	 market	 index	(NYSE	 firms)	over	 the	5-day	window	(t-2,	 t+2)	around	 the	M&A	announcement,	 t.	Brown	and	Warner	 (1980)	 show	 that	 the	 use	 of	 a	 market-adjusted	 model	 in	 estimating	 the	 abnormal	returns	 in	 an	 event	 study	 is	 robust,	 as	 the	 adjustment	 for	 the	 firm’s	 systematic	 risk	 does	 not	improve	the	precision	of	the	short-term	abnormal	returns.	The	mean	level	0.17%	is	in	line	with	previous	 research	 suggesting	 that,	 on	 average,	 M&As	 do	 not	 yield	 additional	 wealth	 to	 the	acquiring	firm	(see	Alexandridis	et	al.	(2010)).	Nevertheless,	the	high	standard	deviation	of	CAR,	its	maximum	(86.69%),	and	minimum	(-33.66%)	values	 suggest	a	 substantial	 variation	 in	 the	M&A	wealth	effects	among	the	acquirers.	
(Insert	Table	2	about	here)	Moreover,	we	follow	Officer	(2003)	by	dividing	the	deal	value	by	the	target’s	market	value	of	equity	43	days	before	the	announcement,	subtracting	1,	and	multiplying	the	result	by	100.	As	the	case	of	CAR,	 the	premium	also	exhibits	substantial	variation	with	values	that	range	from	-98%	for	targets	that	are	close	to	bankruptcy	to	a	maximum	of	653%.3	DEV_ACQ	 and	 DEV_TARG	 refer	 to	 the	 degrees	 of	 the	 acquirer’s	 and	 the	 target’s	 pre-acquisition	mispricing,	 respectively,	 from	 the	 t-243	 to	 the	 t-43	 day	 preceding	 the	 acquisition	announcement,	t.	These	variables	are	described	in	more	detail	in	Section	4.	DEV_MKT	refers	to	the	 market-level	 degree	 of	 mispricing	 and	 is	 discussed	 in	 more	 detail	 in	 Section	 6.	ACQUIRER_TRADING	 and	 TARGET_TRADING	 are	 the	 variables	 representing	 the	 level	 of	acquirer	 and	 target	 share	 turnover,	 respectively,	 from	 the	 t-43	 to	 the	 t-10	 day	 preceding	 the	acquisition	announcement,	t.	As	proposed	by	Gervais	et	al.	(2001),	the	trading	activity	is	a	proxy	for	 the	 level	 of	 investor	 attention.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 our	 analysis,	 the	 increase	 in	 this	 trading	activity	in	response	to	mispricing	should	reflect	the	growing	role	of	investors	who	accumulate	costly	 information	 that	guides	 the	merging	 firms’	 synergy-generating	 strategies.	The	 turnover	rate	is	estimated	as	the	average	daily	ratio	of	traded	shares	volume	relative	to	listed	shares	over	the	corresponding	period.	The	(t-43,	t-10)	window	is	chosen	to	represent	the	period	following	
																																								 																				
3 Officer (2003) excludes deals with premium levels higher than 200% or lower than 0%. The results reported in this article 
hold if the same approach is followed. 
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the	pre-acquisition	mispricing	and	preceding	the	acquisition	announcement,	when	investors	are	likely	 to	 dedicate	 substantial	 attention	 to	 the	 merging	 firms’	 stocks	 and	 collect	 relevant	information	 about	 the	 prospect	 of	 the	 acquisition.	 In	 this	 article	 we	 argue	 that	 the	 trading	activity	conveys	valuable	information	that	contributes	to	the	design	of	high-synergy	deals	by	the	merging	firms’	managers	who	are	carefully	observing	the	stock	market	developments.	Table	2	also	covers	a	rich	set	of	factors	that	we	employ	as	control	variables	in	our	analysis	such	as	the	acquirer	and	the	target	market	values	and	the	market-to-book	value	ratios,	43	days	before	the	acquisition’s	announcement	day.	Moreover,	we	include	the	percentages	of	target	shares	owned	by	the	acquiring	firm	before	the	bid	announcement	as	well	as	the	acquirer	shares	that	are	closely	held	by	a	limited	group	of	family	 members	 or	 institutional	 shareholders.	 While	 Datastream	 reports	 the	 percentage	 of	target	shares	that	are	closely	held,	the	inclusion	of	such	a	variable	in	our	analysis	substantially	reduced	our	sampled	deals.	For	 the	same	reason,	we	only	 include	 the	acquirer	Debt-to-Assets	ratio	 43	 days	 before	 the	 deal.	 Appendix	 1	 provides	 a	 detailed	 description	 of	 the	 source,	acronym,	and	construction	of	each	variable.		
4.	Measuring	Firm-Specific	Mispricing	The	 rich	 array	 of	 studies	 evaluating	 long-range	 dependence	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 two	 distinct	branches.	 The	 first	 branch	 is	 primarily	 focused	 on	 determining	 the	 degree	 of	 long-range	dependence	 using	 a	 quantifiable	 measure	 (Cajueiro	 &	 Tabak,	 2004;	 Peters,	 1994;	 Saffi	 &	Sigurdsson,	 2011;	 Sensoy	 &	 Tabak,	 2015).	 The	 second	 branch	 is	 mainly	 concerned	 with	developing	 statistics	 to	 test	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 long-range	 dependence	 (see	 Lo	 (1991)	 for	instance).	 The	 latter	 approach	 represents	 an	 interesting	 research	 area	 that	 depends	 on	 the	statistical	assumptions	adopted	in	developing	and	applying	the	various	long-range	dependence	tests.	However,	given	that	the	analysis	in	this	article	is	assembled	around	the	evaluation	of	the	variations	 in	 the	 degrees	 of	 dependence	 in	 stock	 returns	 rather	 than	 testing	 propositions	related	to	the	significance	of	such	dependence,	the	first	approach	is	adopted.	The	exponent	developed	by	Hurst	 (1951)	 is	used	 to	quantify	 the	diffusion	of	 information	into	prices.	The	value	of	the	Hurst	exponent	determines	whether	a	series:	(a)	follows	a	random	walk	when	H=0.5,	(b)	exhibits	a	trend	reinforcing	pattern	when	H>0.5,	or	(c)	displays	frequent	reversals	when	H<0.5.	Following	Peters's	(1994)	introduction	of	the	Fractal	Market	Hypothesis	whereby	 stock	 returns	 are	 hypothesized	 to	 exhibit	 long-range	 dependence,	 this	measure	 has	been	used	 in	previous	research	to	study	the	dynamic	behavior	of	aggregate	stock	 indices	(see	Alvarez-Ramirez	et	al.	(2008),	Sensoy	and	Tabak	(2015),	Cajueiro	and	Tabak	(2004)	and	Serletis	and	Rosenberg	(2007)).	
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Compared	 to	 alternative	 measures	 of	 mispricing	 such	 as	 the	 autocorrelation	 in	 stock	returns	and	the	explanatory	power	of	lagged	market	returns	(Saffi		Sigurdsson,	2011),	the	Hurst	exponent	has	the	advantage	of	providing	inferences	about	the	distribution	of	returns	in	addition	to	 highlighting	 their	 degree	 of	 autocorrelations.	 As	 explained	 in	 detail	 by	 Fama	 (1963),	 the	Hurst	exponent	is	the	inverse	of	the	characteristic	exponent	α	of	the	characteristic	function	for	Mandelbrot’s	 stable	 paretian	 distributions.	 H=0.5	 indicates	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 normal	distribution	(α	=2),	the	only	paretian	stable	distribution	with	a	finite	variance.	When	" = $%	is	in	the	interval	0	<	α	<	2,	the	family	of	paretian	distributions	has	no	finite	variance	and	the	extreme	tails	 of	 distributions	 are	 higher	 than	 those	 of	 the	 normal	 distribution.	 The	 most	 important	consequence	is	that	the	variance	exists	(i.e.,	is	finite)	only	in	the	extreme	case	where	α	=	2.	The	mean,	 however,	 exists	 as	 long	 as	 α	 >	 1.	 Moreover,	 by	 quantifying	 the	 extent	 of	 information	diffusion	 into	prices,	 rather	 than	the	magnitude	of	overvaluation	or	undervaluation,	 the	Hurst	exponent	–as	a	measure	of	mispricing–	is	less	restrictive	compared	to	alternative	measures	such	as	 Rhodes-Kropf	 et	 al.	 (2005)	 which	 are	 based	 on	 the	 theoretical	 decomposition	 of	 the	company’s	market-to-book	ratio.	In	estimating	the	Hurst	exponent,	Mandelbrot	(1973)	emphasizes	the	superiority	of	the	R/S	analysis	to	alternative	techniques	in	detecting	long-run	dependence.	To	introduce	this	analysis,	we	 follow	the	same	notations	adopted	by	Weron	(2002).	First,	 for	 the	window	covering	the	t-240	 to	 t-43	 days	 period	 before	 the	 M&A	 announcement,	 the	 series	 with	 length	 &	 of	 each	company’s	stock	returns	over	the	risk-free	rate	is	divided	into	'	subseries	of	length	(.	For	each	subseries,	) = 1,… , ',	the	mean	-.	and	the	standard	deviation	/.	are	estimated.	Second,	these	returns	 are	normalized	by	 subtracting	 the	 sample	mean	12,. = -2,. − -.	 for	 each	 subsample	4 = 1, … . . , (	 to	 create	 the	 cumulative	 series	 62,. = 17,.278$ .	 Third,	 the	 range	 9. =):; 6$,., … . . , 6<,. − )4( 6$,., … . . , 6<,. 	 is	 calculated	 and	 scaled	 by	 dividing	 it	 by	 /. .	 The	rescaled	range	of	all	subseries	of	length	(	is:		 (9//	)< = 1' 9. /.@.8$ 	 (1)	which	asymptotically	follows	the	power	law:		 (9//	)<	~	B(% 	 (2)	with	 c	 as	 a	 constant.	 By	 artificially	 increasing	 (,	C	 can	 be	 estimated	 by	 Ordinary	 Least	Square	(OLS)	using	the	following	regression:		 log	 9// < = log B + C log (	 (3)	
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However,	 following	the	observation	that	 the	estimated	 level	of	 the	Hurst	exponent	C	deviates	significantly	 from	0.5	 in	 small	 samples,	Anis	and	Lloyd	 (1976)	provide	expected	values	of	 the	R/S	analysis	under	the	null	hypothesis	of	random	walks.4	
	 -(9//	)< = 	( − 0.5( Γ ( − 0.52(Γ((2) ( − 44
<L$
28$ 	 (4)	Γ	is	the	Euler	gamma	function.	For	the	197	(t-240,	t-43)	day	window	of	each	acquirer	and	target,	the	 expected	H	 level	 is	 estimated	by	 introducing	 the	 expected	value	 from	Equation	 (4)	 in	 the	regression	Equation	 (3).	The	 resulting	expected	value	 is	0.557.	Hence,	 the	variables	DEV_ACQ	and	DEV_TARG	 in	Table	2	refer	 to	 the	absolute	value	of	 the	difference	between	 the	estimated	Hurst	exponent	value	and	0.558	for	the	acquirer	and	the	target,	respectively.	The	descriptive	statistics	for	each	of	the	variables	are	reported	in	Table	2.	The	Table	shows	that	the	estimated	mispricing	measures	–	DEV_ACQ	and	DEV_TARG	–	take	values	ranging	from	0	whereby	the	stock	is	efficiently	priced,	to	0.55	at	which	the	Hurst	exponent	fully	deviates	from	the	 predicted	 value	 under	 efficient	 pricing.	 Such	 dispersion	 in	 the	 estimated	 degree	 of	mispricing,	while	suggesting	various	degrees	of	firm-specific	pricing,	can	also	be	influenced	by	the	 noisiness	 in	 our	 estimation.	 Such	 noisiness	might	 be	 due	 to	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 estimation	window	 or	 the	 presence	 of	 outliers.	 To	minimize	 these	 effects	 in	 our	 results,	 we	 employ	 the	dummy	variables	MISPRICED_ACQ	and	MISPRICES_TARG	which	 are	 assigned	 the	 value	of	 1	 if	variables	DEV_ACQ	and	DEV_TARG	take	values	that	exceed	their	median	levels,	and	0	otherwise.	Table	3	provides	a	comparison	between	the	mean	values	of	the	empirical	variables	among	acquirers	(targets)	that	experienced	pre-acquisition	mispricing	and	acquirers	(targets)	that	did	not	experience	such	mispricing.	With	respect	to	the	wealth	effect	of	takeovers	on	the	acquirer’s	shareholders,	the	univariate	evidence	reported	in	Table	3	suggests	that	acquirers	shareholders	receive	 1%	 higher	 CAR	 in	 deals	 including	 pre-acquisition	 mispriced	 acquirers	 (targets)	compared	to	deals	in	which	the	acquirers	(targets)	did	not	experience	a	period	of	mispricing.	
(Insert	Table	3	about	here)	Note	that	the	means	of	most	of	the	covariates	do	not	differ	between	the	deals	in	which	the	acquirer	 (target)	 experiences	 pre-acquisition	mispricing	 and	 the	 deals	 in	 which	 the	 acquirer	(target)	 does	 not	 experience	 such	 a	 pre-bid	 mispricing.	 This	 suggests	 that,	 at	 least	 at	 the	univariate	level,	the	degree	of	pre-acquisition	mispricing	and	consequently	informed	trading	is	not	particularly	dependent	on	specific	firm	characteristics.		
5.	Firm-Level	Results	and	Discussion	
																																								 																				
4 This equation was initially provided by Anis and Lloyd (1976) and was then modified by Peters (1994). More specifically, 
the term <LM.N<  was added by Peters to provide further improvement of the R/S analysis’s performance in small samples.  
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The	informed	trading	in	response	to	the	mispricing	of	a	company’s	shares	allows	the	managers	and	the	potential	acquiring	firms	to	extract	valuable	information	that	will	be	useful	in	steering	their	subsequent	investment	decisions.	If	this	empirical	prediction	holds,	we	should	then	expect	that	 the	 turnover	 in	 the	shares	of	 the	acquirers	and	 targets	whose	securities	displayed	a	high	degree	of	 pre-acquisition	mispricing	 to	predict	 high	 acquirer	 announcement	period	 abnormal	returns.	 A	 potential	 concern	 regarding	 these	 predictions	 is	 that	 the	 high	 abnormal	 returns,	 if	present,	might	reflect	an	inaccurate	assessment	of	the	deal’s	wealth	effects	due	to	the	merging	firms’	pre-acquisition	mispricing.	As	a	result,	this	section	also	analyses	the	post-announcement	buy-and-hold	 abnormal	 returns	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 announcement	 period	 abnormal	returns	are	reversed	in	the	post-announcement	period.		
5.1.	Announcement	Period	Returns	Table	 4	 presents	 the	 multivariate	 regression	 analysis	 of	 the	 determinants	 of	 acquirer	announcement	period	5-day	CAR.	The	estimated	models	have	the	following	specification:	
	
OP9_POR2 = " + S$PORTU9-9_V9PWUXY2 + SZVP9Y-V_V9PWUXY2+ S[PORTU9-9_V9PWUXY2×]U/^9UO-W_POR2+ S_VP9Y-V_V9PWUXY2×]U/^9UO-W_VP9Y2 + S7127`78N + a2 	
(5)	
where	 Model	 (1)	 does	 not	 include	 year	 and	 industry	 fixed-effects,	 while	 Model	 (2)	 includes	these	 factors.5	 S71277`8N 	 presents	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 control	 variables	 and	 a2 	 is	 an	 error	 term	with	an	expected	value	of	0.	S$	and	SZ	represent	the	effect	of	the	pre-acquisition	trading	activity	in	response	to	low	mispricing	for	the	acquirer	and	the	target,	respectively.	S$ + S[	represent	the	average	effect	of	the	trading	activity	in	the	acquiring	firm’s	shares	on	the	announcement	period	acquirer	 abnormal	 returns	 in	 response	 to	 high	 pre-acquisition	 mispricing.	 SZ + S_	 represent	this	effect	based	on	the	trading	in	the	target’s	securities.	If	our	main	empirical	predictions	hold,	S$ + S[	and	SZ + S_	should	represent	significant	and	positive	effects	on	the	acquirer	CAR.	This	finding	would	 support	 the	notion	 that	 the	 trading	activity	 in	 response	 to	high	pre-acquisition	mispricing	transfers	a	more	informative	aspect	than	the	trading	activity	that	emerges	when	the	level	of	mispricing	is	relatively	low.	
(Insert	Table	4	about	here)	Table	4	presents	 the	 two	models	 following	 the	 specification	 (5).	 Interestingly,	 the	wealth	effects	of	both	the	acquirer’s	and	the	target’s	pre-acquisition	activity	are	statistically	significant	only	when	this	activity	is	preceded	by	high	degrees	of	mispricing.	In	Model	(1),	the	coefficients	associated	with	ACQUIRER_TRADING	and	TARGET_TRADING	(-0.46	and	-042	respectively)	are	
																																								 																				
5 The levels of pre-acquisition turnover for both the acquiring and the target firms do not differ between high and low levels 
of mispricing. Nevertheless, our main prediction is not that trading activity that arises in response to mispricing is 
necessarily high but rather that such activity carries relevant information that guides the merging firms’ takeover plans. 
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statistically	 insignificant.	 However,	 the	 coefficients	 associated	 with	 ACQUIRER_TRADING	 ´	MISPRICED_ACQ	 and	 TARGET_TRADING	 ´	 MISPRICED_TARG	 (1.01	 and	 1.18)	 are	 positive,	larger	in	magnitude,	and	statistically	significant	at	the	5%	level.	When	year	and	industry	fixed-effects	 are	 added	 in	Model	 (2),	 the	 level	 of	 the	 statistical	 significance	 of	 these	 coefficients	 is	reduced.	Nevertheless,	both	these	effects	remain	significant	at	the	10%	significance	level.	This	results	 supports	 the	 application	 of	 the	 Grossman	 and	 Stiglitz	 (1980)	 analysis	 in	 the	 takeover	market	 by	 suggesting	 that	 the	 pre-acquisition	 trading	 activity,	 in	 both	 the	 acquirer’s	 and	 the	target’s	shares,	presents	a	significant	predictor	of	acquirer	abnormal	retruns	when	this	activity	follows	a	period	of	temporary	mispricing.	As	discussed	in	Section	1	(Introduction	Section),	we	control	 for	the	effect	of	various	firm-	and	deal-related	factors	that	influence	the	deal’s	synergies	and	also	the	market’s	perception	of	such	synergies.	To	highlight	the	wealth	effects	of	stock	financing	on	acquirer	abnormal	returns	(Shleifer	and	Vishny,	2003;	Rhodes–Kropf	and	Viswanathan,	2004;	Rhodes–Kropf	et	al.,	2005),	a	dummy	variable	assigned	 the	value	of	1	 if	 the	deal	 is	 stock	 financed	 (STOCK)	 is	 added	 to	our	analysis,	among	the	other	factors	that	we	control	 for.	To	emphasize	the	effect	of	the	acquiring	firm’s	 familiarity	with	 the	 target	 firms’	business	environment,	we	employ	 two	proxies:	 (a)	we	control	 for	 the	 effect	 of	 toeholds	 (TOEHOLD_ACQ)	 and	 (b)	we	 control	 for	 the	 effect	 of	 cross-industry	 acquisitions	 (DVRD).	Moreover,	 our	 analysis	 accounts	 for	 the	percentage	of	 acquirer	shares	 that	 are	 closely	 held	 by	 large	 blocks	 of	 shareholders	 that	 are	 likely	 to	 ‘listen’	 to	 the	market	and	are	 immune	to	agency	problems	(Kau	et	al.,	2008).	 In	addition,	we	control	 for	 the	effect	 of	 the	 premium	offered	 to	 the	 target	 firm	 to	 control	 for	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	market	might	treat	the	payment	of	high	premia	as	a	sign	of	overpayment	or	high	synergies	in	the	deal	(Antoniou,	Arbour,	&	Zhao,	2008).	We	 also	 control	 for	 the	 effects	 of	 firm-specific	 factors	 that	 potentially	 affect	 the	 equity	investors’	ability	to	accurately	assess	the	effects	of	the	announced	takeovers	on	acquirer	value.	Both	 the	 acquiring	 and	 the	 target	 firms’	 sizes	 are	 controlled	 for	 following	 the	 observation	by	Roll	 (1981)	 that	 investors	 face	 substantial	 difficulties	 in	 assessing	 the	 riskiness	 of	 small	companies.	Noteworthy,	the	smaller	stocks	are	difficult	to	undertake	arbitrage	with	because	of	the	high	 fixed	 trading	costs.	Moreover,	we	control	 for	 the	wealth	effects	of	 the	merging	 firms’	market-to-book	value	ratios	 following	Lakonishok	et	al's	 (1994)	 findings	related	 to	 the	equity	investors’	 overvaluation	 of	 growth	 companies,	 undervaluation	 of	 value	 companies,	 and	 the	temporary	 difficulties	 in	 immediately	 arbitraging	 away	 such	 misvaluations.	 An	 alternative	reason	for	including	the	market-to-book	value	ratio	in	our	analysis	relates	to	the	possibility	that	its	 decline	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 associated	 with	 financial	 distress,	 which	 makes	 companies	 more	difficult	 to	 value,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 correction	 of	 their	 mispricing	 highly	 costly	 (Chelley-Steeley,	Lambertides,	&	Savva,	2017).	In	addition	to	being	proxies	for	valuation	difficulties,	the	merging	
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firms’	 sizes	 and	market-to-book	 value	 ratios	 can	 also	 proxy	 for	 the	 potential	 synergies	 to	 be	realized	from	the	deal.	Lastly,	we	control	 for	the	 level	of	pre-acquisition	riskiness	for	both	the	acquiring	 and	 the	 target	 companies	 by	 introducing	 the	 standard	 deviation	 of	 their	 abnormal	returns	 to	 the	analysis.	While	we	do	not	explicitly	 interpret	 the	effects	of	 these	variables,	 it	 is	important	to	note	that	our	findings	remain	both	economically	and	statistically	significant	after	controlling	for	their	effects.			
5.2.	Post-announcement	Abnormal	Returns	To	 examine	whether	 the	 increases	 in	 the	 acquirer	 announcement	 period	 CAR	 in	 response	 to	mispricing	 are	 reversed	 in	 the	 post-announcement	 period,	 we	 examine	 in	 a	 multivariate	framework	 the	 variation	 in	 the	 acquirer	 post-announcement	 buy-and-hold	 abnormal	 returns	(BHARs).	The	acquirer	holding	period	abnormal	returns,	which	are	the	differences	between	the	cumulative	 returns	 of	 investment	 in	 the	 acquirer	 shares	 and	 those	 in	 the	 market	 index,	 are	computed	for	the	holding	periods	of	12	and	36	months	from	the	end	of	the	deal’s	announcement	month.	The	BHARs	are	analyzed	in	a	multivariate	framework	within	the	following	equation:	
	
bCP9 ; 2 = " + S$PORTU9-9_V9PWUXY2 + SZVP9Y-V_V9PWUXY2+ S[PORTU9-9_V9PWUXY2×]U/^9UO-W_POR2
+ S_VP9Y-V_V9PWUXY2×]U/^9UO-W_VP9Y2 + S7127`78N + a2 	
(6)	
which	has	the	same	specification	as	Equation	(5)	with	the	dependent	variable	being	bCP9(;)2 ,	which	 is	 the	 acquirer	 i’s	 BHARs	 for	 the	 ;-months	 period	 following	 the	 the	 end	 of	 the	 deal’s	announcement	month.	If	the	positive	announcement	period	abnormal	returns	driven	by	trading	activity	in	response	to	mispricing	are	themselves	an	illustration	of	such	mispricing,	then	S[	and	S_	should	be	negative	and	significant	to	highlight	a	reversal	in	the	announcement	period	wealth	effects.	 In	 both	 Models	 (1)	 and	 (2),	 with	 and	 without	 year	 and	 industry	 fixed-effects	respectively,	none	of	the	coefficients	associated	with	ACQUIRER_TRADING,	TARGET_TRADING,	ACQUIRER_TRADING	 ´	 MISPRICED_ACQ	 and	 TARGET_TRADING	 ´	 MISPRICED_TARG	 are	statistically	 significant.	 Hence,	 the	 initial	 wealth	 effects	 of	 share	 turnover	 in	 response	 to	mispricing	effects	are	not	reversed	in	the	long-run.	Such	results	support	the	proposition	that	the	share	 turnover	 in	 response	 to	 acquirer	 and	 target	 mispricing	 provides	 information	 to	 the	merging	firms	to	earn	persistent	synergies	to	their	takeovers.	
(Insert	Table	5	about	here)	
	
6.	Time	Series	Analysis	
6.1.	Time	variation	in	the	market	Hurst	exponent	
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One	of	 the	main	 tasks	 in	 this	 article	 is	 to	 investigate	whether	 the	 firm-level	 analysis	 that	 has	been	executed	in	the	preceding	sections	also	applies	to	the	aggregate	relationship	between	the	degree	of	market	mispricing	and	the	growth	rates	in	corporate	profits.	Within	the	context	of	the	Grossman	and	Stiglitz	(1980)	conclusion,	temporary	market-wide	mispricing	can	incentivize	the	equity	investors	to	collect	valuable	information	about	the	overall	macroeconomic	environment.	Such	 information	 can	 help	 corporations	 adjust	 their	 investment	 plans	 in	 a	 way	 that	 will	ultimately	 foster	 corporate	 growth	 and	 boost	 profitability.	 We	 expect,	 ceteris	 paribus,	 the	growth	in	stock	market	trading	activity	that	follows	the	increases	in	market-wide	mispricing	to	be	associated	with	future	increases	in	corporate	profits	growth.	Accordingly,	in	order	to	analyze	the	impact	of	the	variation	of	market-wide	mispricing,	we	measure	 the	 quarterly	 degree	 of	market	 efficiency	 as	 the	 Hurst	 exponent	 of	 the	 daily	 excess	returns	of	the	63	trading	days	covered	in	each	quarter	from	1970	through	2014.	The	levels	of	excess	returns	are	for	the	value-weighted	portfolio	of	all	CRSP	firms	incorporated	in	the	US	and	listed	 on	 the	 NYSE,	 AMEX,	 or	 NASDAQ.	 These	 excess	 returns	 are	 retrieved	 from	 Professor	Kenneth	French’s	website.	As	in	Alvarez-Ramirez	et	al.	(2008),	our	estimations	highlight	erratic	dynamics	of	persistent	and	anti-persistent	behavior	in	the	stock	market.	Figure	 1	 depicts	 the	 time-varying	 quarterly	 levels	 of	 the	 estimated	 Hurst	 exponent	measures	 for	 the	 US	 stock	market	 from	 the	 first	 quarter	 of	 1970	 until	 the	 fourth	 quarter	 of	2014.	As	argued	by	Alvarez-Ramirez	et	al.	(2008),	the	long-term	trend	of	the	US	stock	market’s	Hurst	 exponent	 is	 negative,	 suggesting	 an	 inclination	 towards	 more	 efficient	 behavior.	 The	authors	attribute	this	increase	in	market	efficiency	to	the	free-floating	currency	arrangements,	the	free	capital	flows	and	the	increasing	participatory	aspects	of	financial	markets	following	the	end	 of	 the	 Bretton	Woods	 system.	Moreover,	 the	 periods	 of	market	 turbulence	 –	 such	 as	 the	1987	 and	 2007	 crashes	 –	 are	 characterized	 by	 Hurst	 exponent	 levels	 below	 0.5.	 Such	 levels	reflect	 the	 frequent	 reversals	 in	 stock	 returns	 and	 the	 increasing	 volatility	 levels	 that	 tend	 to	emerge	during	these	periods	of	market	instability.	
(Insert	Figure	1	about	here)	
	
6.2.	TVAR	model	The	Threshold	Vector	Autoregression	 (TVAR)	models	 (Galvao,	2003;	Tong,	1983;	Tsay,	1998)	present	a	flexible	tool	for	testing	our	empirical	predictions	at	the	market-wide	level.	TVARs	are	piecewise	linear	models	where	the	values	of	a	pre-chosen	threshold	variable	determine	various	autoregressive	 regimes.	 This	 family	 of	models	 is	 able	 to	 capture	 various	 non-linear	 relations,	multiple	 equilibria,	 and	 also	 asymmetric	 reactions	 from	 the	 endogenous	 variables.	Moreover,	the	coefficients	within	each	regime	can	be	recovered	with	computational	ease	via	simple	sum	of	least	squares	minimization.	In	applying	these	models,	the	empiricist	does	not	have	to	determine	
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a	priori	threshold	levels.	Instead,	a	grid	search	is	applied	to	determine	the	threshold	levels	that	minimize	 the	 sum	 of	 squared	 residuals	while	 estimating	 the	 OLS	 coefficients.	 This	method	 is	known	as	Conditional	Least	Squares	(CLS).	We	estimate	the	following	two-regime	TVAR	model:		 cd = "$ + P$ & cd + 	a$d					4e	W-f_]gVdL[ ≤ i	"Z + PZ & cd + 	aZd				4e	W-f_]gVdL[ > i	 (7)	In	 this	model,	W-f_]gV	 is	 the	pre-determined	 threshold	variable	and	i	 is	 the	estimated	threshold	value.	This	measure	is	used	to	determine	the	market-wide	mispricing	and	consists	of	absolute	value	of	the	difference	between	the	estimated	Hurst	exponent	and	its	predicted	value	of	0.51	under	the	null	hypothesis	of	random	walk.		cd	 is	 the	 4	 ×	 1	 column	 vector	 that	 includes	 DEV_MKT,	 the	 growth	 in	 corporate	 profits	(PROFIT_GROWTH),	 the	 stock	market’s	 excess	 returns	 (EXCESS_RETURNS),	 and	 the	 quarterly	growth	rate	in	the	S&P	500’s	volume	of	traded	shares	(VOLUME_GROWTH).	"2 ,	4 = 1,2,	are	4	×	1	column	vectors	 of	 constants.	 The	matrices	P2 & = P2$& + P2Z&Z 	+ P2[&[	are	 estimated	with	&	being	the	 lag	operator.	The	 lag	order	 is	set	at	3	according	to	 the	Akaike	 Information	Criterion	(AIC).	 The	 error	 term	 ad	 is	 the	 normally	 distributed	 error	 term	with	 an	 expected	 value	 of	 0.6	Table	6	reports	the	equations	that	explain	the	variation	in	the	stock	market	trading	activity	and	corporate	profits	growth	in	the	estimated	TVAR	model.	The	estimated	threshold	value	of	three-quarter	 lagged	 value	 of	 market-wide	mispricing	 (0.04)	 separates	 the	 overall	 model	 into	 two	sub-models.	The	first	sub-model	covers	62%	of	the	observations	while	the	remaining	38%	are	covered	in	the	second	sub-model.	As	predicted,	the	growth	in	the	traded	volume	of	the	S&P	500	shares	predicts	future	growth	in	corporate	profits	only	in	the	regime	that	emerges	in	response	to	high	market	mispricing.	In	particular,	the	two-quarter	lag	of	S&P	500	trading	volume	growth	(VOLUME_GROWTH(-2))	 in	 this	 regime	 has	 a	 positive	 and	 significant	 effect	 on	 the	 growth	 in	corporate	 profits.	 One	 can	 interpret	 this	 finding	 as	 evidence	 that	 an	 increased	 trading	 stock	market	 activity	 in	 response	 to	 market-wide	 mispricing	 proves	 critical	 information	 to	corporations	seeking	to	steer	their	investment	strategies	to	realize	higher	profits.	Interestingly,	in	the	low	market	mispricing	regime,	the	growth	in	the	traded	volume	of	the	S&P	500	does	not	predict	future	variations	in	corporate	profits.	
(Insert	Table	6	about	here)	Overall,	the	findings	presented	above	support	the	‘active	informant	hypothesis’	postulated	by	Morck	et	al.	(1990)	whereby	the	variation	in	stock	returns	conveys	useful	information	about	the	 overall	 state	 of	 the	 economy	 and	 consequently	 guides	 corporate	 investment	 decisions.	Nevertheless,	 the	 distinguishing	 aspect	 of	 these	 findings	 is	 their	 emphasis	 on	 the	 role	 of	inefficient	pricing	as	a	key	 incentive	 for	 relevant	 information	collection.	More	 specifically,	 the	
																																								 																				
6 In untabulated results, the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected for the empirical variables in the estimations based on the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test. 
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conclusion	 of	 the	 time	 series	 results	 is	 in	 line	 with	 the	 results	 of	 the	 firm-level	 analysis	suggesting	 that	 the	 periods	 of	 temporary	 mispricing	 offer	 companies	 with	 a	 valuable	opportunity	 to	 extract	 performance-improving	 information	 that	 boosts	 profitability	 and	shareholder	wealth.	These	results	should	be	interpreted	within	the	context	of	the	generally	efficient	and	liquid	US	 stock	 market	 in	 which	 mispricing	 patterns	 tend	 to	 be	 temporary.	 More	 specifically,	mispricing	patterns	 in	 less	 developed	markets	might	 reflect	 fundamental	 problems	 related	 to	the	 lack	 of	 liquidity	 and	 the	 weak	 legal	 framework	 that	 limit	 investor	 participation.	Consequently,	 further	 empirical	 investigation	 is	 required	 to	 determine	 whether	 our	 findings	hold	in	non-US	contexts,	especially	in	less	developed	markets.		
6.3.	Testing	Non-linearity	In	order	for	the	choice	of	TVAR	models	rather	than	linear	models	to	be	appropriate,	the	tested	threshold	 effects	 should	 be	 statistically	 significant	 overall.	 The	 multivariate	 extension	 of	 the	linearity	test	advanced	by	Hansen	(1999)	and	Lo	and	Zivot	(2001)	is	used	to	assess	the	level	of	this	significance.	This	test	computes	Likelihood	Ratio	(LR)	test	based	on	the	covariance	matrix	attached	to	each	model.	The	LR	statistic	can	be	presented	as	follows:		 &9M$ = V ln 'lmΣM − ln 'lmΣ$ 	 (8)	In	 Equation	 (8),	 ΣM	 is	 the	 estimated	 covariance	 matrix	 of	 the	 model	 under	 the	 null	hypothesis	of	no	threshold	effect;	Σ$	is	the	estimated	covariance	matrix	under	the	alternative	of	a	 two-regime	 model;	 and	 V	 is	 the	 number	 of	 observations	 in	 the	 series.	 The	 bootstrap	distribution	of	this	statistic	is	based	on	(a)	resampling	the	residuals	from	the	model	under	the	null	hypothesis,	and	(b)	estimating	the	threshold	parameter	and	computing	the	test.	Results	are	obtained	 by	 using	 the	 middle	 70%	 of	 the	 sorted	 observations	 based	 on	 Hansen's	 (1996)	recommendation	that	the	optimal	trimming	level	is	15%.	When	this	test	is	applied	to	the	TVAR	model	 in	 Table	 6,	 the	 resulting	 p-value	 is	 0.001.	 This	 significant	 threshold	 effect	 further	validates	the	use	of	the	TVAR	model	in	the	time	series	analysis	in	Section	6.2.		
7.	Conclusion	This	 article	 traces	 the	 implications	 of	 investors’	 efforts	 to	 collect	 rare	 and	 costly	 information,	especially	 in	 response	 to	 periods	 of	 inefficient	 pricing,	 on	 acquirer	 abnormal	 returns.	 In	 the	main	 analysis,	we	predict	 that	 the	 increase	 in	mispricing	 should	motivate	 investors	 to	 collect	costly	 information	 that	 also	 guides	 corporate	 managers	 in	 making	 value-	 and	 performance-enhancing	corporate	decisions.	By	using	 the	deviation	of	 the	Hurst	 exponent	 from	 its	predicted	value	under	 the	 random	walk	hypothesis	as	a	proxy	 for	both	 the	 firm-level	and	 the	market-wide	degree	of	mispricing,	
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the	 findings	 offer	 strong	 support	 to	 our	 predictions.	We	 find	 that	 the	 trading	 activity	 in	 the	shares	of	the	acquiring	and	the	target	firms	–	especially	when	such	shares	have	been	subject	to	temporary	 mispricing	 –	 presents	 a	 significant	 predictor	 of	 increases	 acquirer	 announcement	period	 abnormal	 returns.	 Such	 abnormal	 returns	 are	 not	 reversed	 in	 the	 post-announcement	period.	 This	 result	 is	 robust	 to	 the	 inclusion	 in	 our	 estimations	 of	 various	 controls	 reflecting	deal-	 and	 firm-related	 characteristics.	 In	 turn,	 at	 the	 market-wide	 level,	 the	 increase	 in	 the	overall	 degree	 of	 mispricing	 is	 associated	 with	 future	 increases	 in	 corporate	 profits	 growth,	after	controlling	for	the	effects	of	the	prevailing	financial	conditions.	Overall,	our	results	emphasize	the	role	of	the	stock	market’s	informativeness	in	influencing	corporate	 investment	 decisions	 and	performance,	 especially	when	 some	degree	 of	mispricing	motivates	 equity	 investors	 to	 collect	 rare	 and	 costly	 firm-specific	 information	 that	 guides	corporate	decisions.	Nevertheless,	we	are	still	cautious	in	generalizing	our	findings	into	non-US	contexts	due	 to	 the	 requirement	of	 controlling	 for	various	 factors	 such	as	 the	degree	of	 stock	market	 development	 and	 the	 institutional	 arrangements	 that	 govern	 the	 market.	 The	investigation	 of	 these	 effects	 in	 a	 cross-country	 analysis	 presents	 a	 fruitful	 area	 for	 future	research.											
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(Acronym)	Acquirer’s	CAR	(CAR_ACQ)		 The	acquirer’s	5-day	(-2,	2)	announcement	period	cumulative	abnormal	returns.	The	abnormal	return	in	each	day	is	the	difference	between	the	firm’s	returns	and	the	value-weighted	returns	of	NYSE	firms.		 Datastream	Acquirer’s	Closely	Held	Shares	(CLOSELYHELD_ACQ)	 The	percentage	of	the	target’s	shares	that	are	closely	held	by	a	small	group	of	investors.	 Datastream	Acquirer’s	Debt-to-Assets	(DEBT_ACQ)	 The	acquirer’s	ratio	of	Debt	to	Assets	43	days	prior	to	the	bid	announcement.	 SDC	Acquirer’s	Market	Value	(MV_ACQ)	 The	acquirer’s	market	value	of	equity	43	days	prior	to	bid	announcement,	in	millions	of	dollars.		 Datastream	Acquirer’s	Market-to-Book	Value	(MTBV_ACQ)	 The	market	value	of	the	acquirer	43	days	before	the	acquisition,	divided	by	its	book	value	of	equity	from	the	most	recent	accounting	statement	prior	to	the	bid	announcement.	 Datastream	Acquirer’s	Market-to-Book	Value	(MTBV_TARG)	 The	market	value	of	the	target	43	days	before	the	acquisition,	divided	by	its	book	value	of	equity	from	the	most	recent	accounting	statement	prior	to	the	bid	announcement.	 Datastream	
Acquirer’s	Mispricing	(DEV_ACQ)	
The	absolute	value	of	the	difference	between	the	estimated	Hurst	exponent	of	the	acquirer’s	daily	returns	and	this	exponent’s	predicted	value	(0.558)	under	the	random	walk	hypothesis.	The	daily	returns	used	to	estimate	the	Hurst	exponent	cover	the	window	from	the	240th	to	43rd	day	that	precede	the	bid	announcement.		
Datastream	+	Authors’	Estimations	
Acquirer’s	Pre-Acquisition	Standard	Deviation	(SD_ACQ)		 The	standard	deviation	of	the	acquirer’s	daily	abnormal	returns	for	the	240	to	43	day	window	that	precede	the	bid	announcement.	 SDC	Acquirer’s	Toehold	(TOEHOLD_ACQ)		 The	percentage	of	the	target’s	shares	that	are	held	by	the	acquirer	before	the	deal’s	announcement.	 SDC	Buy-and-hold	abnormal	returns	of	the	acquiring	firm	for	x	years	following	the	acquisition	(BHAR(;))	
The	acquirer’s	buy-and-hold	abnormal	returns	for	the	period	of	;	months	following	the	acquisition.	 Datastream	
Cash	Financed	Transactions	(CASH)	 Dummy=1	if	the	consideration	is	100%	financed	with	cash	and	0	otherwise.	 SDC	Diversifying	Deals	(DVRD)	 Dummy=1	if	the	acquirer	and	the	target	have	different	two-digit	SIC	codes,	and	0	otherwise	(FCSD).	 SDC	GDP	Growth		(GDP_GROWTH)	 The	quarterly	(annualized)	growth	rate	of	real	gross	domestic	product.		 The	US	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis	Growth	in	the	Stock	Market’s	Trading	Volume	(VOLUME_GROWTH)	 The	quarterly	growth	rate	in	the	total	number	of	traded	shares	of	the	companies	listed	in	the	S&P	500.	 Datasream	
Market’s	Mispricing	(DEV_MKT)	
The	absolute	value	of	the	difference	between	the	estimated	Hurst	exponent	of	the	stock	market’s	daily	excess	returns	and	this	exponent’s	predicted	value	under	the	random	walk	hypothesis	in	each	quarter.	The	daily	returns	used	to	estimate	the	Hurst	exponent	cover	the	63	trading	days	in	each	quarter.	
Datastream	+	Authors’	Estimations	
Mispriced	Acquirer	(MISPRICED_ACQ)	 Dummy=1	if	DEV_ACQ	exceeds	its	median	level	of	0.12,	and	0	otherwise.	 Datastream	+	Authors’	Estimations	Mispriced	Target	(MISPRICED_TARG)	 Dummy=1	if	DEV_TARG	exceeds	its	median	level	of	0.12,	and	0	otherwise.	 Datastream	+	Authors’	Estimations	Premium	Paid	in	the	Deal	PREMIUM	(%)	 The	deal’s	value	divided	by	the	target	firm’s	market	value	43	days	before	the	acquisition,	minus	1.	The	resulting	measure	is	multiplied	by	100.		 SDC	+	Datastream	Profits	Growth	(PROF_GROWTH)	 The	seasonally	adjusted	quarterly	(annualized)	growth	rate	of	corporate	profits	level	after	tax.		 The	US	Bureau	of	Economic	Analysis	Stock	Financed	Acquisitions	(STOCK)	 Dummy=1	when	the	consideration	is	100%	financed	with	stocks	and	0	otherwise.	 SDC	Target’s	Market	Value	(MV_TARG)	 Target’s	market	value	of	equity	43	days	prior	to	bid	announcement,	in	millions	of	dollars.	 Datastream				
Continued	
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Target’s	Mispricing	(DEV_TARG)	
The	absolute	value	of	the	difference	between	the	estimated	Hurst	exponent	of	the	target’s	daily	returns	and	this	exponent’s	predicted	value	(0.558)	under	the	random	walk	hypothesis.	The	daily	returns	used	to	estimate	the	Hurst	exponent	cover	the	240th	to	43rd	day	that	precede	the	bid	announcement.	
Datastream	+	Authors’	Estimations	
Target’s	Pre-Acquisition	Standard	Deviation	(SD_TARG)		 The	standard	deviation	of	the	target’s	daily	returns	for	the	240th	to	43rd	day	that	precede	the	bid	announcement		 SDC	The	Acquirer’s	pre-acquisition	trading	(ACQUIRER_TRADING)	 The	average	daily	ratio	of	the	acquirer’s	traded	shares	to	listed	ones	for	the	period	ranging	from	the	43rd	to	10th	day	before	the	acquisition	announcement.	 Datastream	The	Acquirer’s	pre-acquisition	trading	(TARGET_TRADING)	 The	average	daily	ratio	of	the	target’s	traded	shares	to	listed	shares	for	the	period	ranging	from	the	43rd	to	10th	day	before	the	acquisition	announcement.	 Datastream	The	Stock	Market’s	Excess	Returns	(EXCESS_RETURNS)	 The	difference	between	the	quarterly	level	of	market	returns	and	the	risk	free	rate	of	interest.		 Professor	Kenneth	French’s	website	
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Table	1:	Annual	distribution	of	our	sampled	deals		 		 Panel	A	 Panel	B	YEAR	 ALL	 CASH	 STOCK	 FCSD	 DVRD	 IND	 HCR	 CST	 MAT	 MED	 RTL	 CPS	 HT	 EPW	 TLC	 FIN	 RST	2001	 124	 47	 77	 85	 39	 6	 11	 4	 2	 3	 1	 7	 39	 4	 5	 41	 1	2002	 67	 35	 32	 41	 26	 2	 10	 1	 3	 4	 3	 4	 19	 2	 3	 16	 0	2003	 72	 34	 38	 49	 23	 1	 7	 1	 0	 1	 1	 7	 18	 3	 4	 26	 3	2004	 79	 41	 38	 51	 28	 3	 14	 3	 2	 1	 2	 7	 22	 4	 2	 18	 1	2005	 68	 40	 28	 38	 30	 5	 11	 2	 2	 2	 1	 3	 22	 1	 3	 14	 2	2006	 73	 53	 20	 41	 32	 2	 8	 3	 2	 3	 1	 2	 24	 5	 2	 18	 3	2007	 68	 53	 15	 39	 29	 4	 12	 1	 3	 5	 2	 4	 19	 0	 4	 13	 1	2008	 38	 28	 10	 25	 13	 2	 7	 0	 0	 0	 2	 0	 16	 2	 1	 8	 0	2009	 38	 17	 21	 25	 13	 1	 5	 3	 1	 0	 0	 2	 13	 5	 2	 5	 1	2010	 57	 45	 12	 39	 18	 5	 9	 1	 1	 0	 0	 2	 25	 2	 2	 10	 0	2011	 38	 23	 15	 29	 9	 3	 6	 0	 5	 0	 0	 0	 3	 4	 3	 10	 4	2012	 36	 23	 13	 23	 13	 2	 3	 1	 0	 0	 1	 3	 8	 2	 3	 13	 0	2013	 45	 27	 18	 36	 9	 2	 6	 2	 0	 1	 2	 3	 7	 4	 1	 15	 2	2014	 46	 25	 21	 32	 14	 1	 8	 3	 3	 3	 1	 3	 6	 4	 3	 9	 2	
N	 849	 491	 358	 553	 296	 39	 117	 25	 24	 23	 17	 47	 241	 42	 38	 216	 20	%	 100.00	 57.83	 42.17	 65.14	 34.86	 4.59	 13.78	 2.94	 2.83	 2.71	 2.00	 5.54	 28.39	 4.95	 4.48	 25.44	 2.36		Note:	Panel	A	represents	the	annual	distribution	of	public-to-public	M&A	bids	announced	by	US	acquirers	between	January	1st,	2001	and	December	31st,	2014.	The	distribution	of	the	sample	is	presented	according	to	the	total	number	of	transactions	(ALL),	method	of	payment	(Cash	or	Stock),	and	whether	the	acquisition	is	industry-focused	(FCSD)	or	diversifying.	Panel	B	represents	the	yearly	distribution	of	the	M&A	bids	with	respect	to	the	target’s	sector.	The	sectors,	as	reported	by	SDC,	are:	Industrials	(IND),	Healthcare	(HCR),	Consumer	Staples	(CST),	Materials	(MAT),	Media	and	Entertainment	(MED),	Retail	(RTL),	Consumer	Products	(CPS),	High-Technology	(HT),	Energy	and	Power	(EPW),	Telecommunications	(TLC),	Financials	(FIN)	and	Real	Estate	(RST).
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Table	2:	Summary	statistics		 Variable	 Mean	 Median	 Max	 Min	 SD	CAR_ACQ	(%)		 -0.17	 -0.16	 86.69	 -33.66	 9.06	PREMIUM	(%)	 53.42	 41.89	 653.71	 -98.16	 65.49	DEV_ACQ	 0.14	 0.12	 0.55	 0.00	 0.11	DEV_TARG	 0.15	 0.12	 0.55	 0.00	 0.11	MV_TARG	(m$)	 837	 166	 53535	 1.19	 3076	MV_ACQ	(m$)	 19702	 2579	 525775	 3.69	 44881	MTBV_ACQ		 3.29	 1.83	 231.55	 0.09	 9.44	MTBV_TARG		 2.71	 1.96	 26.94	 0.03	 2.60	TOEHOLD_ACQ	(%)	 2.92	 0.00	 95.32	 0.00	 12.92	CLOSELYHELD_ACQ	(%)	 12.88	 6.78	 93.96	 0.01	 15.91	SD_TARG	(%)		 3.63	 3.00	 22.01	 0.00	 2.42	SD_ACQ	(%)		 2.60	 2.00	 23.47	 0.64	 01.88	DEBT_ACQ	(%)	 20.35	 18.60	 78.80	 0.00	 16.05	ACQUIRER_TRADING	(%)	 0.92	 0.57	 14.74	 0.00	 1.27	TARGET_TRADING	(%)	 0.70	 0.38	 8.39	 0.01	 0.93		Note:	 This	 table	 represents	 descriptive	 statistics	 for	 the	 continuous	 covariates	 in	 the	 sample.	 For	 each	 empirical	 variable,	 the	mean,	median,	maximum,	minimum	and	standard	deviation	values	are	reported.	Please	refer	to	Appendix	1	for	an	accurate	description	of	the	variables.	
		
Table	3:	Univariate	analysis		
Variable	 (1)	Mean	in	deals	in	which	the	acquirer	had	pre-bid	mispricing	
(2)	Mean	in	deals		in	which	the	acquirer	did	not	have	pre-bid	mispricing	
(1)	-	(2)		
(3)	Mean	in	deals	in	which	the	target	had	pre-bid	mispricing	
(4)	Mean	in	deals		in	which	the	target	did	not	have	pre-bid	mispricing	
(3)	–(4)	
CAR_ACQ	(%)		 0.38	 -0.71	 1.08*	 0.58	 -0.89	 1.44**	PREMIUM	(%)	 55.68	 51.22	 4.46	 55.82	 51.04	 4.78	MV_TARG	(m$)	 788.11	 885.72	 -97.61	 821.86	 853.04	 -31.19	MV_ACQ	(m$)	 19497.24	 19902.55	 -405.31	 19036.34	 20369.32	 -1332.98	MTBV_ACQ		 3.11	 3.48	 -0.37	 3.64	 2.94	 0.70	MTBV_TARG		 2.66	 2.76	 -0.10	 2.65	 2.77	 -0.12	TOEHOLD_ACQ	(%)	 0.06	 0.06	 0.00	 0.07	 0.06	 0.01	CLOSELYHELD_ACQ	(%)	 0.28	 0.33	 -0.05*	 0.32	 0.29	 0.02	SD_TARG	(%)	 3.60	 3.67	 -0.08	 3.53	 3.73	 -0.20	SD_ACQ	(%)		 2.61	 2.60	 -0.02	 2.52	 2.69	 -0.2	DEBT_ACQ	(%)	 20.88	 19.84	 1.04	 20.28	 20.43	 -0.15	ACQUIRER_TRADING	(%)	 0.95	 0.89	 0.06	 0.93	 0.92	 0.01	TARGET_TRADING	(%)	 0.76	 0.72	 -0.04	 0.69	 0.72	 -0.03		Note:	 This	 table	 reports	 the	mean	 value	 of	 each	 empirical	 variable	 employed	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 group	 of	 deals	 in	which	 the	acquirers	 (targets)	 experienced	 periods	 of	 pre-bid	 mispricing	 and	 the	 group	 of	 deals	 in	 which	 the	 acquirers	 (targets)	 did	 not	experience	such	mispricing.	We	also	report	the	difference	between	each	variable’s	mean	in	the	deals	in	which	the	acquirer	(target)	experienced	pre-bid	mispricing	 and	 the	mean	 in	deals	 in	which	 the	 acquirer	 (target)	did	not	 experience	pre-bid	mispricing.	The	significance	 of	 the	 t-test	 with	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 that	 this	 difference	 is	 equal	 to	 0	 is	 also	 reported.	 ***,	 **,	 and	 *	 represent	significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	respectively.																																
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Table	4:	Acquirer	announcement	period	CAR		 Dependent	Variable	 CAR_ACQ	 CAR_ACQ	Explanatory	Variable\Model	(.)	 (1)	 (2)	Intercept	 3.362	(2.159)	 1.3617	(2.765)	ACQUIRER_TRADING	 -0.441	(0.447)	 -0.388	(0.487)	TARGET_TRADING	 -0.444	(0.488)	 -0.508	(0.480)	ACQUIRER_TRADING	x	MISPRICED_ACQ	 1.006**	(0.455)	 0.898*	(0.475)	TARGET_TRADING	x	MISPRICED_TARG	 1.199**	(0.613)	 1.074*	(0.622)	DEV_ACQ	 -0.041	(2.927)	 0.552	(2.927)	DEV_TARG	 3.369	(2.764)	 3.734	(2.723)	STOCK	 -2.768***	(0.658)	 -3.027***	(0.273)	DVRD	 -0.138	(0.634)	 -0.022	(0.626)	ln(MV_TARG)	 -0.540**	(0.254)	 -0.585**	(0.268)	ln(MV_ACQ)	 -0.007	(0.224)	 0.073	(0.224)	MTBV_ACQ	 0.001	(0.022)	 0.003	(0.023)	MTBV_TARG	 -0.197	(0.184)	 -0.137	(0.192)	TOEHOLD_ACQ	 -0.323	(1.519)	 -0.802	(1.462)	CLOSELYHELD_ACQ	 0.017	(0.025)	 0.021	(0.026)	SD_TARG	 -0.343*	(0.198)	 -0.295	(0.230)	SD_ACQ	 0.605	(0.404)	 0.757	(0.467)	DEBT_ACQ	 0.039**	(0.019)	 0.037	(0.022)	PREMIUM	 -0.015**	(0.007)	 -0.016**	(0.006)	Year	and	Industry	Effects	 NO	 YES	
N	 849	 849	Adjusted	R-Squared	 0.04	 0.06		Note:	This	table	reports	the	results	of	the	cross-sectional	analysis	explaining	the	5-day	announcement	period	acquirer	Cumulative	Abnormal	 Returns	 (CAR_ACQ)	 in	 the	 takeover	 deals	 covered	 in	 the	 sample.	 The	 standard	 errors	 reported	 in	 parentheses	 are	corrected	 for	 heteroskedasticity	 using	 the	 White	 (1980)	 heteroskedasticity	 consistent	 standard	 errors.	 ***,	 **,	 and	 *	 represent	significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	respectively.	Please	refer	to	Appendix	1	for	an	accurate	description	of	the	variables.																		
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Table	5:	The	acquirer	long-term	BHARs		 Dependent	Variable	 BHAR	(12)	 BHAR	(36)	Explanatory	Variable\Model	(.)	 (1)	 (2)	Intercept	 6.657	(11.547)	 -5.065	(10.601)	ACQUIRER_TRADING	 -1.033	(1.816)	 -0.768	(1.817)	TARGET_TRADING	 2.706	(2.175)	 2.576	(2.180)	ACQUIRER_TRADING	x	MISPRICED_ACQ	 -0.297	(2.036)	 -0.653	(2.038)	TARGET_TRADING	x	MISPRICED_TARG	 2.584	(2.591)	 2.498	(2.595)	DEV_ACQ	 -17.683	(13.998)	 -16.656	(13.962)	DEV_TARG	 -8.791	(13.817)	 -7.359	(13.840)	STOCK	 -3.028	(3.344)	 -2.527	(3.329)	DVRD	 -0.213	(2.926)	 -0.193	(2.931)	ln(MV_TARG)	 -0.710	(1.262)	 -1.118	(1.257)	ln(MV_ACQ)	 0.708	(0.986)	 1.219	(0.970)	MTBV_ACQ	 -0.150	(0.142)	 -0.142	(0.142)	MTBV_TARG	 -0.671	(0.568)	 -0.731	(0.569)	TOEHOLD_ACQ	 8.181	(5.732)	 9.229*	(5.737)	CLOSELYHELD_ACQ	 -0.044	(0.092)	 -0.019	(0.091)	SD_TARG	 -0.319	(0.872)	 -0.052	(0.870)	SD_ACQ	 1.127	(1.780)	 1.927*	(1.143)	DEBT_ACQ	 -0.032	(0.097)	 -0.025	(0.097)	PREMIUM	 -0.021	(0.022)	 -0.020	(0.022)	Year	and	Industry	Effects	 YES	 YES	
N	 848	 757	Adjusted	R-Squared	 0.04	 0.03		Note:	 This	 table	 reports	 the	 results	 of	 the	 cross-sectional	 analysis	 explaining	 the	 buy-and-hold	 acquirer	 returns	 in	 the	 takeover	deals	 covered	 in	 the	 sample.	 The	 standard	 errors	 reported	 in	 parentheses	 are	 corrected	 for	 heteroskedasticity	 using	 the	White	(1980)	heteroskedasticity	consistent	standard	errors.	***,	**,	and	*	represent	significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	respectively.	Please	refer	to	Appendix	1	for	an	accurate	description	of	the	variables.																	
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Table	6:	TVAR	model	of	the	effects	of	market	mispricing		 	 DEV_MKT	(-3)	≤	0.04	(61.9%)	 DEV_MKT	(-3)	>	0.04	(38.1%)	Dependent	Variable	 VOLUME_GROWTH	 PROFIT_GROWTH	 VOLUME_GROWTH	 PROFIT_GROWTH	Explanatory	Variable\Model	(.)	 (1)	 (2)	 (4)	 (5)	Intercept	 -2.754	(3.349)	 0.488	(2.043)	 22.657***	(6.147)	 -4.261	(3.750)	VOLUME_GROWTH	(-1)	 -0.165	(0.107)	 -0.118*	(0.065)	 -0.437***	(0.124)	 0.116	(0.076)	VOLUME_GROWTH	(-2)	 -0.288***	(0.098)	 0.012	(0.060)	 -0.471***	(0.112)	 0.176**	(0.068)	VOLUME_GROWTH	(-3)	 -0.031	(0.093)	 -0.144**	(0.057)	 -0.171	(0.127)	 0.080	(0.078)	DEV_MKT(-1)	 141.456***	(42.276)	 -28.784	(25.794)	 -42.038	(52.356)	 39.876	(31.944)	DEV_MKT(-2)	 63.599	(45.601)	 39.782	(27.822)	 3.173	(47.718)	 31.563	(29.114)	DEV_MKT(-3)	 41.066	(107.531)	 58.339	(65.608)	 -148.779*	(82.314)	 49.836	(50.222)	PROFIT_GROWTH(-1)	 -0.074	(0.232)	 0.290**	(0.141)	 -0.379**	(0.168)	 -0.386***	(0.103)	PROFIT_GROWTH(-2)	 0.079	(0.098)	 0.079	(0.098)	 -0.526**	(0.254)	 -0.339**	(0.155)	PROFIT_GROWTH	(-3)	 -0.006	(0.104)	 -0.006	(0.104)	 -0.468**	(0.213)	 0.293**	(0.130)	EXCESS_RETURNS(-1)	 0.201	(0.148)	 0.155	(0.091).	 0.245	(0.171)	 -0.060	(0.104)	EXCESS_RETURNS(-2)	 -0.290**	(0.144)	 0.049	(0.088)	 -0.330	(0.186).	 0.137	(0.114)	EXCESS_RETURNS(-3)	 0.021	(0.130)	 0.037	(0.079)	 -0.105	(0.219)	 0.042	(0.133)		Note:	This	 table	reports	 four	equations	of	 the	TVAR	model	 that	 links	corporate	profits	growth	(PROFIT_GROWTH),	 the	degree	of	market	mispricing	(DEV_MKT)	and	the	stock	market’s	excess	returns	(EXCESS_RETURNS).	The	threshold	variable	is	DEV_MKT	with	a	 one-quarter	 lag.	 The	 equations	 reported	 explain	 the	 variation	 in	market	mispricing	 (DEV_MKT)	 and	 corporate	 profits	 growth	(PROFIT_GROWTH).	 The	 standard	 errors	 reported	 in	 parentheses	 are	 corrected	 for	 heteroskedasticity	 using	 the	 White	 (1980)	heteroskedasticity	consistent	standard	errors.	***,	**,	and	*	represent	significance	at	the	1%,	5%	and	10%	levels	respectively.	Please	refer	to	Appendix	1	for	an	accurate	description	of	the	variables.																						
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Figure	1:	The	time-varying	dynamics	of	the	US	stock	market’s	quarterly	Hurst	exponent		
		Note:	 This	 figure	 visualizes	 the	 time	 variation	 of	 the	 quarterly	 Hurst	 exponent	 levels	 estimated	 for	 the	 US	 stock	market	 from	 the	 first	 quarter	 of	 1970	 until	 the	 fourth	 quarter	 of	 2014.	 The	Hurst	 exponents	 are	 estimated	 using	equation	(3)	for	the	63	trading	days	for	each	quarter.	This	figure	also	depicts	a	best-fit	line	highlighting	the	negative	trend	in	the	quarterly	Hurst	exponent	levels	during	the	post-Bretton	Woods	period.	
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